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1 .  I n t r o d u c t i o n  
I n  t h e  1 6 0 0 s  p h y s i o l o g i s t s  w e r e  b e g i n n i n g  t o  
u n d e r s t a n d  t h e  f u n c t i o n i n g  o f  t h e  m a j o r  o r g a n s  o f  t h e  
b o d y  a n d  t h e  c i r c u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  b l o o d .  J a m e s  R a c h e l s  
t e l l s  u s  h o w  t h e s e  r a p i d  a n d  e x c i t i n g  a d v a n c e s  w e r e  
a c h i e v e d  b y  e x p e r i m e n t a l  p r o c e d u r e s  w h i c h  s u b j e c t e d  
a n i m a l s  t o  e x c r u c i a t i n g  t o r t u r e s :  " D o g s ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  
w o u l d  b e  r e s t r a i n e d  b y  n a i l i n g  t h e i r  p a w s  t o  b o a r d s ,  
a n d  t h e n  w o u l d  b e  c u t  o p e n  s o  t h a t  t h e  w o r k i n g  o f  t h e i r  
i n n a r d s  c o u l d  b e  o b s e r v e d .  T h i s  w a s  l o n g  b e f o r e  t h e  
d e v e l o p m e n t  o f a n a e s t h e t i c s ,  a n d  t h e  d o g s '  v o c a l  c o r d s  
w o u l d  s o m e t i m e s  b e  c u t  s o  t h a t  t h e i r  s h r i e k s  w o u l d  n o t  
d i s t u r b  t h e  a n a t o m i s t s . "  
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M a n y  t h o u g h t  t h a t  n o n h u m a n  a n i m a l s  ( h e r e a f t e r  
s i m p l y  ' a n i m a l s ' )  d i d  n o t  d e s e r v e  a n y  s y m p a t h y  b e c a u s e  
t r a d i t i o n a l  m o r a l i t y ,  g r o u n d e d  i n  A r i s t o t l e  a n d  A q u i n a s ,  
m a d e  t y p i c a l l y  h u m a n  r a t i o n a l i t y  t h e  c r i t e r i o n  o f m o r a l  
s t a n d i n g .  T h e  c a p a c i t y  t o  e x p e r i e n c e  p a i n  w a s  n o t  
s u f f i c i e n t  t o  c o n f e r  m o r a l  s t a n d i n g .  B u t  s h o u l d  o n e  
n e v e r t h e l e s s  h a v e  h a d  d o u b t s  a b o u t  a n i m a l s '  c r i e s  o f  
a g o n y  a n d  w r i t h i n g  i n  p a i n  o n  t h e  e x p e r i m e n t e r s '  
b o a r d s ,  t h e r e  w a s  a l w a y s  D e s e a r t e s  ( 1 5 9 6 - 1 6 5 0 )  t o  
c o m f o r t  o n e .  H e  a r g u e d  t h a t  a n i m a l s  o n l y  h a d  b o d i e s  
b u t  n o  m i n d s .  T h e y  w e r e  m a c h i n e s  w i t h o u t  c o n s c i o u s  
m e n t a l  s t a t e s  a n d  i n c a p a b l e  e v e n  o f  f e e l i n g  p a i n .  
H u m a n s ,  h o w e v e r ,  c o m p r i s e d  t w o  s e p a r a t e  e n t i t i e s ,  n o t  
o n l y  a  m a c h i n e - l i k e  b o d y  b u t  a l s o  a n  i m m a t e r i a l  m i n d ,  
a n d  w e r e  t h e r e f o r e  c a p a b l e  o f  t h o u g h t  a n d  f e e l i n g .  
T o d a y  a  C a r t e s i a n  v i e w  o f  a n i m a l s  a s  f e e l i n g l e s s  
a u t o m a t a  m i g h t  s e e m  c o m p l e t e l y  c o u n t e r - i n t u i t i v e  o r  
c o n t r a r y  t o  c o m m o n  s e n s e .  B u t  w h y  w o u l d  w e ,  w h o  
h a v e  m u c h  t h e  s a m e  p h y s i o l o g i c a l  e v i d e n c e  f o r  a n i m a l  
p a i n  a s  o u r  s e v e n t e e n t h - c e n t u r y  p r e d e c e s s o r s ,  b o l d  m o r e  
h u m a n e  v i e w s ?  F i r s t ,  b e t w e e n  a b o u t  1 5 0 0  a n d  1 8 0 0  a n  
a l t e r n a t i v e ,  m o r e  h u m a n e ,  t r a d i t i o n  t o  t h a t  o f  
A r i s t o t e l i a n - T h o m i a n  r a t i o n a l i t y  a n d  t h e  C a r t e s i a n  
m a c h i n e  m o d e l  o f a n i m a l s  e m e r g e d  i n  E n g l a n d  a n d  p a r t s  
o f w e s t e r n  E u r o p e  a m o n g  l a y  p e o p l e  a n d  s c i e n t i s t s  a l i k e .  
S o  i t  w o u l d  b e  w r o n g  t o  t h i n k  t h a t  o u r  m o d e r n  
s e n s i b i l i t i e s  t o w a r d s  a n i m a l s  a n d  t h e  n a t u r a l  w o r l d  h a d  
n o  h i s t o r i c a l  r o o t s  i n  t h e  v e r y  t i m e  t h a t  t h e  t r a d i t i o n  o f  
t y p i c a l l y  h u m a n  r a t i o n a l i t y  a n d  t h e  m a c h i n e  m o d e l  w e r e  
a t  t h e i r  h e i g h t .
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S e c o n d ,  b e t w e e n  D e s c a r t e s  a n d  u s  c a m e  
D a r w i n  ( 1 8 0 9 - 1 8 8 2 )  w b o  l o w e r e d  h u m a n s  f r o m  t h e i r  
p e d e s t a l  o f  u n i q u e n e s s  a n d  d i g n i t y  a n d  d e m o n s t r a t e d  
. P H I L O S O P H Y  
S u m m e r  1 9 9 3  
1 4 3  
B e t w e e n  t h e  S p e c i e s  
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the continuity between humans and animals.3 Thus, 
since the 1850s our knowledge of animals certainly 
increased, but far more significant was that all this old 
and new knowledge could now be located coherently 
in the context of a background theory of evolution. A 
rigid divide between, on the one hand, feeling and 
rational humans and, on the other, feelingless and non· 
rational animals became utterly implausible. 
Still, even after Darwin science has often ignored 
or denied animal consciousness, especially in the 
heyday of behaviorism-a new Cartesianism-and 
logical positivism.4 Consciousness remains an 
embarrassment to biologists because of the success of 
neurophysiology in explaining behavior in terms of the 
physical activity of brain cells which appears to leave 
no useful function for conscious feelings.5 Behaviorist 
psychology aside, cognitive psychologists too are 
suspicious of animal consciousness, even when they 
recognize that itmust be assumed to explain all sorts of 
complex animal behavior, and in fact turn out to be 
methodological behaviorists.6 
But what about the philosophers? They also have 
contemporary neo.Cartesians among their ranks. One of 
them is Peter Carruthers, professor of philosophy at the 
University of Sheffield. In 1992 Carruthers published a 
book entitled The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in 
Practice. Having assumed that animals have conscious 
mental states for the sake of the argument in the preceding 
chapters ofhis book, Carruthers argues in the final chapter 
that animals are not deserving of our sympathy because 
all their mental states-experiences (including pain), 
desires, beliefs, and thinking-are non-conscious. 
Animals have again become Cartesian machines. Like 
the Port Royal followers of Descartes one could, on 
Carruthers's view, torture animals with the confident 
conviction that their cries of agony were comparable to 
the noises from machinery.' Or, less dramatically, the 
family veterinarian, who advises a dog owner that the 
paramount consideration in the decision to euthanize or 
not is the dog's suffering, is simply the latter-day 
equivalentofa flat-earther, both holding irrational beliefs. 
In this paper I wish to set out and assess critically 
Carruthers's argument. 
2. A philosophical argument against animal 
consciousness and moral standing 
Carruthers believes that animals are not appropriate 
objects of moral concern that make claims upon our 
sympathy. His argument for this conclusion can be 
summarized as follows: 
PI: 	A mental state (such as an experience, including 
pain, a desire, belief, or thought) is either 
conscious or non-conscious. 
P2: 	A mental state is conscious if it can be 
consciously thought about, that is, consciousness 
that one has a particular mental state is a 
necessary condition for that mental state being 
conscious as opposed to non-conscious. 
P3: Human beings, but not animals, have the ability 
consciously to think about their mental states. 
Cl/P4: Human beings have non-conscious as well 
as conscious mental states, but animals only 
have non-conscious mental states. 
PS: Having the capacity for conscious mental states, 
such as the capacity for conscious experience 
of pain, is a necessary condition for being an 
object ofmoral concern that makes claims upon 
our sympathy. 
C2: Animals are not objects of moral concern that 
make claims upon our sympathy. 
This argument is valid, but I believe that C2, the 
main conclusion, is false and that the argument is 
unsound. In support of this view I shall analyze critically 
each of the five premises on which C2 rests.8 
But before I do this I wish to make a general 
comment about the kind of argument that Carruthers 
puts forward. It is an argument that draws a moral 
conclusion from facts about mental states. I believe that 
this is correct. Intrinsic moral value is aflirmative value 
assigned by valuers (the sources of value) to certain 
things (the loci of value) in virtue of their possessing 
specific kinds of characteristics. More specifically, 
mental states, which are objective features of some 
living things, ground intrinsic value. Put differently, 
living things with mental-state interests, in the sense 
that certain things matter to them subjectively or 
experientially, have moral standing or are objects of 
direct or non-instrumental moral concern which makes 
them direct beneficiaries ofmoral obligations. I believe 
that this is neither a case of deriving an 'ought' from an 
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'is' contrary to Home's dictum, nor an instance of 
Moore's "naturalistic fallacy." This is so because the 
relationship between fact and value in this kind of 
argument is neither one of logical entailment of one 
statement by others, nor one of defining ethics in 
naturalistic terms, but rather one in which factual beliefs 
stand in a relationship of support to a moral belief as 
conclusion.9 
3. The distinction between conscious and non· 
conscious mental states 
In Pl Carrnthers10 draws a distinction between 
conscious and non-conscious mental states. Any human 
mental state-an experience, desire, belief, or thought­
must be either conscious or non-conscious. Beliefs and 
desires are either activated or dormant, and if they are 
activated they are either conscious or non-conscious. 11 
Non-conscious experiences, for example, involve brain 
functioning, cognitive processing and behavior control 
but no conscious awarenessP To talk of experiences 
that are non-conscious is a strange terminological usage 
since we usually link experience logically with feeling 
or consider experience to be conscious by defmition. 
But, as Carruthers recognizes, one could simply change 
his terminology to fit this ordinary usage, in which case 
some cognitive processing and behavior control would 
involve experiences (which are by defmition conscious) 
while others would not. 13 
Examples of non-conscious experiences in humans 
are the following: first, driving a car on a well-known 
route without being consciously aware that one is doing 
so while one's conscious attention is directed elsewhere; 
second, washing up and packing away dishes while one 
is totally absorbed by music that one has put on; and 
third, the phenomenon ofblindsight where people who 
have suffered lesions ofthe striate or visual cortex may 
lose all conscious experience in an area of their visual 
field while retaining the ability to describe objects 
presented to them in that area.l4 
Carruthers next gives an account of the nature of 
the distinction between conscious and non-conscious 
mental states in P2.15 A mental state is conscious if it 
can be consciously thought about. The capacity for 
consciousness that one has an experience is a necessary 
condition for having a conscious experience. If I can 
think to myself that X in appropriate circumstances, 
then belief X is conscious. What I can think aoout is 
equivalent to what I can think to myself. This analysis 
is based on that of Daniel Dennett, for whom conscious 
experiences are those that are available for the subject 
to report. Carruthers modifies Dennett by defining 
consciousness not by its relation to speech production, 
but rather by its relation to a faculty of thinking. The 
ability to speak a natural language is however for 
Carruthers only contingently connected with the 
possession of conscious mental states. 
I wish to make two critical comments about P2. First, 
Carruthers gives an intellectualized or reflexive account 
of the consciousness of mental states by identifying the 
ability to be conscious with the ability to have thoughts. 
But why must a simple experience of an external 
phenomenon, or a feeling of warmth or cold, be 
available for being thought about in order to qualify as 
a conscious experience? Carruthers's account equates 
consciousness not only with self -consciousness but with 
self-consciousness of a certain kind, namely, reflective 
self-consciousness. Only if one can think about one's 
mental states are those mental states conscious, . and 
thinking about an experience is a reflectively self­
conscious activity. Again, why must an experience be 
available for being thought about to be perceptually 
conscious as opposed to being non-conscious? Surely 
a conscious experience could simply be one that is 
immediately present to the mind. There is another kind 
of self-consciousness which is less intellectual than 
reflective self-consciousness and which does appear to 
be connected with consciousness or awareness, namely, 
self-consciousness or self-awareness in the sense of 
having a concept of self, of having a sense of self as 
distinct from the world, or of knowing the difference 
between what happens to one and what does not. 16 An 
ability to recognize dangers and threats to oneself is 
evidence of this kind of minimal or rudimentary self­
consciousness.17 
Second, if language is not a necessary condition for 
consciousness, then it is not clear exactly why it is 
contingently the case that languageless beings are not 
conscious while only beings with the ability to speak a 
natural language are conscious. This case needs to be 
argued. Carruthers promises to do this in a forthcoming 
book.18 Presumably he will then have to show that 
language-using creatures have a Chomskian innate ability 
to speak a natural language that is made possible by innate 
factors which are the very same factors that make 
consciousness possible. But even if this were the case, it 
could be argued that "understanding of reference and 
meaning requires some non-linguistic comprehension of 
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the linkage between sign and what is signified (such as 
ostension) prior to the acquisition oflanguage; otherwise 
the entire processwould never get off the ground. In short, 
language requires a peg ofnon-linguistic experience on 
which to be hung."19 
4. Self-consciousness in animals 
In P3 Carruthers makes two factual claims. First, 
humans have the ability to think consciously about their 
mental states. Second. animals lack this ability. I shall 
discuss the latter claim in this paragraph and the former 
in paragraph 5. 
Do we have evidence that animals can think 
consciously abOut their own mental states? Carruthers 
believes that it follows with very little further argument 
that animal experiences are non-conscious.20 He 
believes it unlikely that birds, mice, dogs, cats, sheep, 
cattle, pigs, or chickens might be thinking things 
consciously to themselves, in which case the 
experiences of all these creatures are non-conscious 
on his analysis. Carruthers makes a little more effort 
investigating the possibility that higher primates, such 
as chimpanzees, have conscious mental states.21 More 
specifically, he asks whether chimpanzees can think 
about their own thoughts. Having considered one 
example, namely, that of a chimpanzee gathering 
eighteen pieces of food from a field where be bad 
previously observed the food being hidden in various 
places, Carruthers concludes that although the 
chimpanzee has a cognitive map of the field, there is 
not a shred of evidence to suggest that he is capable 
of thinking about his thinking. Carruthers then 
suggests "that human beings are unique amongst 
members of the animal kingdom in possessing 
conscious mental states."22 
It is clear that Carruthers dismisses the possibility 
ofanimals having the ability to think about their mental 
states in a rather cavalier a priori manner. First, he 
declines to consider empirical studies of non-primates 
like cats, dogs, and the like. Second, he considers only 
a single case study of higher primates. Third, be 
considers only a single species of higher primates, 
namely chimpanzees (and possibly only a single 
chimpanzee, but that is not clear). Fourth, he considers 
only a single piece of chimpanzee behavior since he is 
confident that "(h)ere is about the most intelligent thing 
that I know of that a chimpanzee can do."23 Fifth, he 
considers only evidence for thinking about thinking and 
not for less intellectual cognitive abilities such as 
thinking about an experience. 
What should Carruthers have done? Clearly, be 
should at least have considered the different kinds of 
evidence for animals' ability to be self-conscious in 
both the reflective sense and in the sense of having a 
concept of self. The kinds of evidence I have in mind 
are animal communication, language-using ability in 
animals, animals' ability to recognize mirror-images 
of themselves, and animal behavior in experimental 
conditions as well as in field research. Weighing such 
evidence is a task in its own right. My point is simply 
that unless this is done we have little reason to accept 
Carruthers's a priori argument. Only if Carruthers 
insists that thoughts be expressible in human language, 
which he does not, would itbe implausible that animals 
can think things consciously. I shall argue (in 
paragraph 6) that we have overwhelming reason to 
believe that animals are conscious, understood in a 
way that does not collapse consciousness into 
reflective self-consciousness. 
It is instructive to note that Rosemary Rodd, who is 
both a biologist and philosopher, puts forward five kinds 
of consideration in favor of self-consciousness in 
animals, a term which she defines as the ability to form 
mental concepts about the self and/or to reflect about 
one's feelings. 24 First, recognition ofexternal or mirror 
images ofoneself, as by chimpanzees, is evidence for a 
sophisticated ability to think about the self from 
'outside' or to displace the concept of self beyond the 
physical body. Second, it is reasonable to believe that 
members of several primate species other than 
chimpanzees possess some ability to have ideas about 
their own knowledge because they appear to have ideas 
about the knowledge which is available to others or 
about others' attitudes and personalities, or they appear 
to form hypotheses about the behavior of others and 
about the relationships between them and others. Third, 
animals must constantly receive information about their 
bodies, and to assume that they can have no concepts 
about this seems implausible since information about 
the self as physical entity must have at least as much 
survival value as information about the external 
environment. Fourth, the imitation of voluntary 
behavior of others, such as an orphaned kitten reared 
with and imitating dogs, is one kind of behavior which 
seems to be explicable only in terms of some degree of 
consciousness of self. Fifth, self-consciousness seems 
to evolve gradually, starting from simple beginnings, 
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E d u c a t e d  A b o u t  A n i m a l  M i n d s  a n d  A n i m a l  S u f f e r i n g  
a n d  p r o b a b l y  d e v e l o p s  g r a d u a l l y  a s  w e  g r o w  u p .  A n d  
i f  s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s  i s  a  m a t t e r  o f  d e g r e e ,  t h e n  a  
s u d d e n  b r e a k ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  a  c o n t i n u u m ,  b e t w e e n  
h u m a n s  a n d  a n i m a l s  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  t h e  p o s s e s s i o n  o f  
s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s  i s  i m p l a u s i b l e .  
5 .  N o n - c o n s c i o u s  h u m a n s  
T h e  s e c o n d  f a c t u a l  c l a i m  m a d e  i n  P 3  i s  t h a t  h u m a n s  
h a v e  t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  t h i n k  c o n s c i o u s l y  a b o u t  t h e i r  m e n t a l  
s t a t e s .  C a r r u t h e r s  s u g g e s t s  " t h a t  h u m a n  b e i n g s  a r e  
u n i q u e  a m o n g s t  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  a n i m a l  k i n g d o m  i n  
p o s s e s s i n g  c o n s c i o u s  m e n t a l  s t a t e s . "
2 5  
H e  s h o u l d  
h o w e v e r  h a v e  q u a l i f i e d  t h e  t e r m  ' h u m a n  b e i n g s '  w i t h  
' s o m e '  o r  ' m o s t ' .  O n  h i s  a n a l y s i s  t h e  ' p a i n '  o f  c e r t a i n  
h u m a n s - l i k e  y o u n g  b a b i e s ,  s e v e r e l y  m e n t a l l y  
d e f e c t i v e  p e o p l e ,  a n d  t h e  v e r y  s e n i l e - m u s t  b e  a  n o n ­
c o n s c i o u s  m e n t a l  s t a t e  j u s t  l i k e  t h a t  o f a n i m a l s  b e c a u s e  
t h e y  c a n n o t  t h i n k  a b o u t  i t .  
E a r l i e r  i n  h i s  b o o k ,  w h e n  h e  s t i l l  w o r k s  o n  t h e  
p r o v i s i o n a l  a s s u m p t i o n  t h a t  a n i m a l s  h a v e  c o n s c i o u s  
m e n t a l  s t a t e s ,  C a r r u t h e r s  u s e s  t w o  m o r a l  a r g u m e n t s  i n  
s u p p o r t  o f  a n  e x t e n s i o n  o f  c o n t r a c t u a l i s m  ( t h e  m o r a l  
t h e o r y  w h i c h  h e  f a v o r s  o v e r  u t i l i t a r i a n i s m )  s o  t h a t  i t  
w o u l d  i n c l u d e  i n  t h e  c l a s s  o f  h o l d e r s  o f  d i r e c t  m o r a l  
r i g h t s  h u m a n  b e i n g s  w h o  a r e  n o t  r a t i o n a l  a g e n t s  o r  
r a t i o n a l  c o n t r a c t o r s  s i n c e  t h e y  a r e  n o t  n o r m a l ,  a d u l t  
h u m a n  b e i n g s .
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N o w  i t  s e e m s  t o  m e  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  
s o m e o n e  c o u l d  a t t e m p t  t o  u s e  t h e s e  a r g u m e n t s ,  n o t  s o  
m u c h  t o  s h o w  t h a t  n o n - r a t i o n a l  h u m a n s  a r e  h o l d e r s  o f  
m o r a l  r i g h t s  w h i l e  a n i m a l s  a r e  n o t ,  b u t  t o  s h o w  t h a t  
h u m a n s  w h o  l a c k  t h e  c a p a c i t y  f o r  c o n s c i o u s  e x p e r i e n c e  
o n  C a r r u t h e r s ' s  a n a l y s i s  ( b e i n g  u n a b l e  t o  t h i n k  a b o u t  
t h e i r  m e n t a l  s t a t e s )  s h o u l d  b e  t r e a t e d  a s  i f  t h e y  w e r e  
c o n s c i o u s  w h i l e  a n i m a l s  s h o u l d  n o t  b e  s o  t r e a t e d .  G i v e n  
t h i s  p o s s i b i l i t y ,  I  w i s h  t o  s h o w  t h a t  t h e s e  m o r a l  a r g u m e n t s  
f a i l  b e c a u s e  t h e y  h a v e  f a l s e  e m p i r i c a l  p r e m i s e s .  
F i r s t ,  t h e  s l i p p e r y  s l o p e  a r g u m e n t  s t a t e s  t h a t  t h e  
d e n i a l  o f  m o r a l  r i g h t s  t o  h u m a n  b e i n g s  o n  t h e  g r o u n d  
t h a t  t h e y  a r e  n o t  r a t i o n a l  a g e n t s  m a y  l a n d  u s  o n  a  
s l i p p e r y  s l o p e  l e a d i n g  t o  a l l  k i n d s  o f b a r b a r i s m  a g a i n s t  
t h o s e  h u m a n s  w h o  a r e  r a t i o n a l  a g e n t s .  T h i s  a r g u m e n t  
f a i l s  b e c a u s e  t h e r e  i s  n o  a  p r i o r i  r e a s o n  w h y  e x c l u d i n g  
a n i m a l s  f r o m  d i r e c t  m o r a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  w o u l d  n o t  
l i k e w i s e  t h r o w  o n e  o n  a  s l i p p e r y  s l o p e .  
S e c o n d .  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  s o c i a l  s t a b i l i t y  a r g u m e n t ,  
a  r u l e  t h a t  w i t h h o l d s  m o r a l  s t a n d i n g  f r o m  n o n - r a t i o n a l  
h u m a n  b e i n g s  i s  l i k e l y  t o  p r o d u c e  s o c i a l  i n s t a b i l i t y  
b e c a u s e  m a n y  p e o p l e  w o u l d  f m d  t h e m s e l v e s  i n c a p a b l e  
o f  l i v i n g  i n  c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  i t .  T h i s  a r g u m e n t  f a i l s  
b e c a u s e  i t  c o u l d  a t  m o s t  o n l y  b e  c o n t i n g e n t l y  s o  t h a t  
e x c l u d i n g  n o n - r a t i o n a l  h u m a n  b e i n g s  f r o m  d i r e c t  m o r a l  
c o n s i d e r a b i l i t y  w o u l d  l e a d  t o  s o c i a l  i n s t a b i l i t y .  T h e r e  
h a v e  b e e n  h i g h l y  c i v i l i z e d  a n d  s t a b l e  s o c i e t i e s  w h i c h  
p r a c t i s e d  i n f a n t i c i d e  o r  e u t h a n a s i a  o f  t h e  a g e d .  
C o n v e r s e l y ,  s o c i a l  s t a b i l i t y  n e e d  n o t  b e  c o n f m e d  t o  r u l e s  
a b o u t  h u m a n  b e i n g s ,  a n d  i n  f u t u r e - i f  i t  i s  n o t  a l r e a d y  
t h e  c a s e - t h e r e  m i g h t  v e r y  w e l l  b e  s o c i e t i e s  i n  w h i c h  
t h e  d e n i a l  o f  m o r a l  s t a n d i n g  t o  a n i m a l s ,  o r  s e n s e l e s s  
d e s t r u c t i o n  o f  t h e  n a t u r a l  e n v i r o n m e n t ,  w o u l d  l e a d  t o  
s o c i a l  i n s t a b i l i t y .  
E l s e w h e r e  C a r r u t h e r s  p r e s e n t s  a  t h i r d  m o r a l  
a r g u m e n t  f o r  w h y  n o n - r a t i o n a l  h u m a n s  s h o u l d  b e  
i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  s p h e r e  o f d i r e c t  m o r a l  c o n c e r n .  
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a n i m a l s ,  n o n - r a t i o n a l  h u m a n s  s h a r e  h u m a n  f o r m  a n d  
m a n y  h u m a n  p a t t e r n s  o f  b e h a v i o r  w i t h  t h o s e  h u m a n s  
w h o  a r e  r a t i o n a l  a g e n t s .  A n d  s i n c e  w e  h a v e  a  n a t u r a l  
i m p u l s e  o f s y m p a t h y  f o r  t h e  s u f f e r i n g s  o f a l l  w h o  s h a r e  
h u m a n  f o r m ,  i n d i f f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  s u f f e r i n g  o f  a  n o n ­
r a t i o n a l  h u m a n  i s  w r o n g  b e c a u s e  o f w h a t  i t  r e v e a l s  a b o u t  
o n e ' s  c h a r a c t e r .  A p a r t  f r o m  t h e  n o t o r i o u s l y  p r o b l e m a t i c  
i s s u e  o f  w h a t  i s  n a t u r a l  a n d  w h a t  i s  a c q u i r e d  i n  h u m a n  
n a t u r e ,  I  c a n n o t  t h i n k  o f  a n y  r e a s o n  w h y  i n d i f f e r e n c e  
t o  t h e  s u f f e r i n g  o f  a n  a n i m a l  c o u l d  n o t  a l s o  b e  w r o n g  
b e c a u s e  i t  r e v e a l s  a  b a d  c h a r a c t e r .  S u r e l y ,  h i g h e r  
p r i m a t e s ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  s h a r e  a  c o n s i d e r a b l e  p a r t  o f  
h u m a n  f o r m  a n d  a l s o  m a n y  t y p i c a l l y  h u m a n  p a t t e r n s  
o f  b e h a v i o r .  W h y  t h e n  w o u l d  t o r t u r i n g  t h e m  n o t  r e v e a l  
s o m e t h i n g  a b o u t  l a c k  o f s e n s i t i v i t y  w h i c h  i s  p a r t  o f w h a t  
i t  m e a n s  t o  h a v e  a  b a d  c h a r a c t e r ?  
I  c o n c l u d e  t h a t  i f  t h e s e  t h r e e  m o r a l  a r g u m e n t s  f a i l ,  
a s  I  t h i n k  t h e y  d o ,  t o  e s t a b l i s h  a d e q u a t e  g r o u n d s  f o r  
i n c l u d i n g  n o n - r a t i o n a l  h u m a n  b e i n g s  i n  t h e  c l a s s  o f  
h o l d e r s  o f  m o r a l  r i g h t s  w h i l e  e x c l u d i n g  a n i m a l s ,  t h e n  
t h e y  w o u l d  l i k e w i s e  f a i l  w e r e  t h e y  t o  b e  u s e d  i n  a n  
a t t e m p t  t o  i n c l u d e ,  o n  e m p i r i c a l  a n d  m o r a l  g r o u n d s ,  
n o n - c o n s c i o u s  h u m a n  b e i n g s  i n  t h e  c l a s s  o f  c o n s c i o u s  
h u m a n  b e i n g s  w h i l e  e x c l u d i n g  a n i m a l s .  
6 .  A n a l o g y ,  e v o l u t i o n a r y  t h e o r y ,  a n d  a n i m a l  
c o n s c i o u s n e s s  
T h e r e  i s  a  v e r y  s t r o n g  a r g u m e n t  f o r  a n i m a l  
c o n s c i o u s n e s s .  I t  i s  a  c o m m o n - s e n s e  e m p i r i c a l  
a r g u m e n t  b y  a n a l o g y  f r o m  h u m a n  b e h a v i o r  i s s u i n g  
f r o m  c o n s c i o u s  m e n t a l  s t a t e s  t o  a n i m a l  b e h a v i o r  
s i m i l a r l y  i s s u i n g  f r o m  c o n s c i o u s  m e n t a l  s t a t e s .  T h e  
a n a l o g y  i s  c o n s i d e r a b l y  s t r e n g t h e n e d  b y  a  m a s s  o f  
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scientific fact about neurophysiological and neuro­
chemical similarities between humans and animals. And 
when this analogical reasoning is located in the context 
of the theory of evolution-which postulates physio­
logical and anatomical continuity, or evolutionary 
kinship, between humans and animals-an opposing 
argument that denies any animal consciousness faces 
fonnidable odds. 
Before I elaborate on this analogical argument, let 
us frrst consider what Carruthers is able to muster in its 
place for his conclusion that animals are non-conscious. 
Ultimately one has to weigh whether Carruthers's 
mechanistic explanation of animal behavior is better 
than the analogical argument which claims that 
consciousness plays a causal role in, or is implicated in 
the explanation of, some animal behavior. 
In P4 Carruthers states that whereas human beings 
have non-conscious as well as conscious mental states, 
animals have only non-conscious mental states .. We saw 
(in paragraph 3) that he cites three examples of non­
conscious experiences in humans. Now, presumably, 
these examples illustrate the non-conscious nature of 
all animal mental life from which issues animal behavior 
and in terms of which animal behavior is to be 
explained. But there are problems with regarding these 
examples as exemplars in this way. First, the examples 
of driving a car and washing dishes without being 
consciously aware ofdoing so involve complex habitual 
actions without being aware of them. However, we were 
consciously aware of these actions in the first place and 
this made it possible to learn how to perform them and 
to concentrate on, or to be distracted by, something else 
while performing them.28 Second, the example of 
blindsight is of people who previously had the ability 
to see, and Evelyn Pluhar argues that it makes no sense 
in a context where no conscious experience has ever 
occurred.29 Blindsight, it will be recalled, is the ability 
to catch balls or identify objects without having any 
conscious experience of seeing because of lesions in 
the visual cortex. In this regard Bernard Rollin remarks 
as follows about Gallup's account ofanimal conscious­
ness which also makes use of the phenomenon of 
blindsight: "Why accept a rare, flukish oddity like blind 
sight as a metaphor for the multitude of apparently 
conscious animal behaviors? There is a huge functional 
discrepancy between blind sight and a great deal of, if 
not most, animal behavior."30 
So, Carruthers asks us to believe that animals are 
non-conscious machines on the basis of these 
problematic examples. But he fails to provide us with 
an explanation of what it would be like to interact in a 
complex way with the environment, perform tasks, 
adapt, learn, and the like without any conscious 
experience at all or ever feeling anything.31 
Is all animal behavior simply reflex or instinct? Are 
animals automata? Is animal behavior better explained 
in terms of the workings of machines or 'hard-wired' 
mechanical devices, albeit with the input of non­
conscious mental states, than in terms of conscious 
mental states, that is, mental contents which are 
immediately present to their minds? Does no animal 
behavior issue from conscious mental states, such as 
conscious experiences, desires, beliefs, or thoughts? 
There is a very strong analogical argument which 
concludes that the best explanation for complex, 
adaptive, flexible animal behavior is that it issues from 
consciousness. Before expanding on this analogy, we 
need to ask why Carruthers's implied mechanistic 
analogy between animals and machines breaks down. 
The obvious answer is that there is no strong physical 
analogy between animals and machines. Machines are 
artifacts, animal species are natural kinds. Machines 
contrast with the structural and functional continuity 
between humans and animals. The intentionality, 
plasticity, and flexibility of the behavior of machines, 
which are suggestive of choice, are only apparent since 
they are in reality parasitic on, or derivative from, such 
descriptions which are given of human behavior which 
issues from consciousness and choice. 32 
One could of course make the machine model of 
animal behavior more sophisticated by using a modem 
computer rather than a clock, as Descartes did, as an 
example ofa machine. The non-conscious mental states 
of animals would then be analogous to software and 
animal brains analogous to hardware. Animals 
conceived as computers would be non-conscious in the 
same way as the most advanced artificial intelligence 
has no conscious mental states. Computer-like 
manipulation by animals of data in terms of logical or 
formal sequences would have syntax but would lack 
any semantics or referential meaning for the animals 
themselves. The semantics of a computer program is 
fully conditional upon the intentionality of the 
programmer or other human beings. A computer can 
forecast the weather or calculate the inflation rate but 
only in a purely logical or formal way without knowing 
what the content of that activity is or what in the world 
it is about. 
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E d u c a t e d  F o l l y  A b o u t  A n i m a l  M i n d s  a n d  A n i m a l  S u f f e r i n g  
W h a t  r e a s o n  d o  w e  h a v e  t h e n  f o r  r e j e c t i n g  a  
m a c h i n e  o r  c o m p u t e r  m o d e l  o f  a n i m a l  b e h a v i o r  i n  
f a v o r  o f  t h e  b e l i e f  t h a t  c o n s c i o u s  m e n t a l  s t a t e s  m e d i a t e  
s o m e  a n i m a l  b e h a v i o r ?  O r  a r e  c o n s c i o u s  a n i m a l  
m e n t a l  s t a t e s  r e d u n d a n t  t h e o r e t i c a l  p o s t u l a t e s  d e v o i d  
o f  e x p l a n a t o r y  v a l u e ?  A f t e r  a l l ,  c o n s c i o u s  a n i m a l  
m e n t a l  s t a t e s  a r e  v a g u e  a n d  c a n n o t  b e  d i r e c t l y  k n o w n ,  
a n d  a n i m a l  m i n d s  a r e  m y s t e r i o u s  a n d  u n f a t h o m a b l e  
t o  u s .  A  q u i c k  r e s p o n s e  w o u l d  b e  t h a t  c o n s c i o u s  h u m a n  
m e n t a l  s t a t e s  c o u l d  l i k e w i s e  b e  v a g u e  a n d  i n c a p a b l e  
o f  b e i n g  k n o w n  d i r e c t l y  n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g  h u m a n  
b e i n g s '  c a p a c i t y  f o r  n a t u r a l  l a n g u a g e .  T h e  m i n d  o f  a  
S e r b  e t h n i c  c l e a n s e r ,  r a p i n g  a  m o t h e r  a n d  g o u g i n g  h e r  
s o n ' s  e y e s ,  c o u l d  l i k e w i s e  b e  i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e .  A l s o ,  
w e  h a v e  v e r y  g o o d  r e a s o n  t o  a c c e p t  t h e  c a u s a l  o r  
e x p l a n a t o r y  r o l e  o f  i n f e r r e d  c o n s c i o u s  m e n t a l  e n t i t i e s  
i n  m u c h  t h e  s a m e  w a y  a s  w e  d o  w i t h  i n f e r r e d  p h y s i c a l  
e n t i t i e s  s u c h  a s  e l e c t r o n  s h e l l s  i n  t h e  m i n u t e s t  
c o n s t i t u e n t s  o f  t h e  p h y s i c a l  w o r l d  a n d  q u a r k s  i n  t h e  
e n o r m i t y  o f  o u t e r  s p a c e .  
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B u t  t h e r e  i s  a  b e t t e r  r e s p o n s e .  T h e r e  i s  a  w i d e s p r e a d  
c o m m o n - s e n s e  b e l i e f  t h a t  a n i m a l s  h a v e  c o n s c i o u s  
m e n t a l  s t a t e s  w h i c h  p l a y  a  c a u s a l  r o l e  i n  t h e i r  b e h a v i o r  
a n d  s e r v e  a s  b e t t e r  e x p l a n a t i o n s  o f  t h e i r  b e h a v i o r  i n  
m a n y  s p e c i f i c  i n s t a n c e s  t h a n  r e d u c t i o n i s t  a c c o u n t s  
w h i c h  e x c l u d e  e x p l a n a t o r y  m e n t a l  c a t e g o r i e s .  O u r  
e v e r y d a y  s p e e c h  a n d  t h e  w a y  i n  w h i c h  w e  t r e a t  a n i m a l s  
t h a t  w e  k n o w  r e f l e c t  t h i s  c o m m o n - s e n s e  b e l i e f .  W e  
m a k e  a n  e m p i r i c a l  i n f e r e n c e  o r  p o s t u l a t i o n  b y  a n a l o g y  
f r o m  t h e  c o m p l e x  c a u s a l  c o n n e c t i o n  b e t w e e n  o u r  o w n  
m e n t a l  s t a t e s ,  s u c h  a s  d e s i r e s  a n d  b e l i e f s ,  a n d  o u r  o w n  
a c t i o n s  t o  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a n i m a l  m e n t a l  s t a t e s  w h i c h  
p l a y  a  c a u s a l  a n d  e x p l a n a t o r y  r o l e  i n  a n i m a l  b e h a v i o r .  
S o ,  o u r  c o m m o n - s e n s e  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  a c r o s s  c u l t u r e s  
a n a l o g i c a l l y  a s c r i b e s  m e n t a l  p r o p e r t i e s  t o  a n i m a l s .  W h y  
i s  t h i s ?  R o d d  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e  " c e n t r a l  r e a s o n  w h y  w e  
b e l i e v e  t h a t  o t h e r  p e o p l e  a n d  a n i m a l s  h a v e  e x p e r i e n c e  
i s  t h a t  w e  a r e  c o n s c i o u s  a n d  w e  h a v e  a n  i n n a t e  t e n d e n c y  
t o  a s c r i b e  c o n s c i o u s n e s s  t o  e n t i t i e s  w h i c h  a c t  i n  w a y s  
w h i c h  w e  r e c o g n i z e  a s  s i g n s  o f  s e n s a t i o n . "
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W e  k n o w  
t h a t  w e  c a n  f m d  o u t  w h a t  a n i m a l s  p r e f e r  i f  w e  p r e s e n t  
t h e m  w i t h  a  c h o i c e  o f a l t e r n a t i v e s .
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O u r c o m m o n - s e n s e  
k n o w l e d g e  o f a n i m a l  b e h a v i o r  i s  t h e  c u m u l a t i v e  w i s d o m  
o f  c e n t u r i e s  o f  s h a r i n g  t h i s  w o r l d  w i t h  t h e m .  
I n  e s s e n c e ,  w e  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  c o m p l e x i t y ,  p l a s t i c i t y ,  
a d a p t a b i l i t y  o r  f l e x i b i l i t y  o f  a n i m a l  b e h a v i o r  i n  
s i t u a t i o n s  o f  c h o i c e  g i v e  u s  g o o d  i n d u c t i v e  r e a s o n  t o  
b e l i e v e  t h a t  a n i m a l s  h a v e  m e n t a l  s t a t e s  w h i c h  m e d i a t e  
t h e i r  b e h a v i o r  a n a l o g o u s  t o  h u m a n  m e n t a l  s t a t e s  
m e d i a t i n g  s i m i l a r  h u m a n  b e h a v i o r  i n  s i m i l a r  c i r c u m ­
s t a n c e s .  T h i s  c o m m o n s e n s i c a l  a n a l o g i c a l  i n f e r e n c e  i s  
c o n s i d e r a b l y  s t r e n g t h e n e d  b y  g r o w t h  i n  s c i e n t i f i c  
k n o w l e d g e ,  n o t  o n l y  o f  a n i m a l  b e h a v i o r  b u t  a l s o  o f  t h e  
s i m i l a r i t i e s  b e t w e e n  h u m a n  a n d  a n i m a l  b o d i e s .  T h u s ,  
s i n c e  m i n d  p r e s u p p o s e s  b o d y ,  o r  a t  l e a s t  c e r t a i n  b o d i l y  
s t r u c t u r e s  s u c h  a s  t h e  c e n t r a l  n e r v o u s  s y s t e m ,  t h e s e  
s i m i l a r i t i e s  m a k e  t h e  c o m m o n - s e n s e  a n a l o g y  a l l  t h e  
m o r e  p l a u s i b l e ,  c e r t a i n l y  m o r e  s o  t h a n  a  m a c h i n e  
a n a l o g y .  B o d i l y  s i m i l a r i t i e s  i n v o l v e  e n z y m e s  a n d  
p r o t e i n s ,  p h y s i o l o g i c a l  a n d  a n a t o m i c a l  s t r u c t u r e s ,  a n d  
o r g a n i c  f u n c t i o n s .  I n  t h e  n e x t  p a r a g r a p h  I  s h a l l  e l a b o r a t e  
o n  t h e  n e u r o p h y s i o l o g i c a l  a n d  n e u r o c h e m i c a l  s i m i l a r i t i e s  
b e t w e e n  h u m a n s  a n d  a n i m a l s  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  f e e l i n g  p a i n .  
H e r e  I  a m  s i m p l y  s t a t i n g  t h e  e l e m e n t s  o f  t h e  a n a l o g y .  
W h y  i s  t h i s  a  g o o d  a n a l o g y ?  R o l l i n  g i v e s  a n  a c c o u n t  
o f t h r e e  o b j e c t i v e  c r i t e r i a  f o r  t h e  a s c r i p t i o n  o f m e n t a t i o n  
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F i r s t ,  t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  m u s t  b e  o f  a  
l i v i n g  o r g a n i s m .  S e c o n d ,  t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  m u s t b e  o f a  k i n d  
t o  s u g g e s t  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  c o n s c i o u s n e s s  a n d  c h o i c e ,  
t w o  e l e m e n t s  w h i c h  w e  r e c o g n i z e  a s  d i s t i n c t i v e  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  m i n d .  T h i r d ,  a n o t h e r  c r i t e r i o n  i s  
n e e d e d  b e c a u s e  w h a t  s e e m s  l i k e  i n t e n t i o n a l  o r  c o n s c i o u s  
c h o i c e  m a y  i n  f a c t  b e  a u t o m a t i c  o r  r e f l e x  a c t i o n .  I t  i s  
p o s s i b l e  t h a t  m e c h a n i s m s  o f  t h e  n e r v o u s  s y s t e m  c o u l d  
p r o d u c e ,  w i t h o u t  t h e  m e d i a t i o n  o r  i n t e r v e n t i o n  o f  
c o n s c i o u s  m e n t a l  s t a t e s ,  h i g h l y  c o o r d i n a t e d  a n d  
a p p a r e n t l y  i n t e n t i o n a l  m u s c u l a r  m o v e m e n t s .  T h i s  t h i r d  
c r i t e r i o n  t h e n  i s  t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  a d a p t  t o  n e w  s i t u a t i o n s  
a n d  t o  l e a r n  f r o m  e x p e r i e n c e .  N o t  o n l y  ' i n t e l l i g e n t '  
b e h a v i o r  b u t  a l s o  m e n t a l  s t a t e s  l i k e  e m o t i o n s  a n d  p a i n  
h a v e  v a l u e  s i n c e  t h e y  e l i c i t  v a r i a b l e ,  a p p r o p r i a t e  
b e h a v i o r ,  d e p e n d i n g  o n  t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s .  T h e s e ,  t h e n ,  
a r e  t h r e e  o b j e c t i v e  m e t h o d s  o f d e t e r m i n i n g  t h e  p r e s e n c e  
o f  s u b j e c t i v i t y .  I n d i c a t o r s  o f  i n t e n t i o n a l i t y ,  p l a s t i c i t y ,  
f l e x i b i l i t y ,  a n d  c h o i c e  a r e  o b j e c t i v e  s i g n s  o f  s u b j e c t i v e  
a w a r e n e s s .  S t u d y i n g  a n i m a l  c o n s c i o u s n e s s  m e a n s  
b e g i n n i n g  w i t h  t h e  f a c t s  o f  o u r  o w n  c o n s c i o u s n e s s  a n d  
e x t e n d i n g  t h e m  o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  a n a l o g y .  
W h a t  i s  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  i f o n e  r e f u s e s  t o  a c c e p t  t h a t  
m a n y  o f  t h e  s u b j e c t i v e  m e n t a l  s t a t e s  o f  h u m a n s  h a v e  
a n a l o g i e s  i n  t h e  c o n s c i o u s  m e n t a l  s t a t e s  o f  a n i m a l s ?  I t  
i s  t o  a c c e p t  t h a t - i n  s p i t e  o f  a l l  t h e  s i m i l a r i t i e s  o f  
b e h a v i o r ,  s t r u c t u r e ,  f u n c t i o n ,  a n d  t h e  l i k e - o f  a l l  t h e  
a n i m a l s  o n  t h e  p h y l o g e n e t i c  s c a l e ,  c o n s c i o u s n e s s  i s  o n l y  
p r e s e n t  i n  h u m a n s .  O f  c o u r s e  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  o n l y  
h u m a n  b r a i n s  h a v e  d e v e l o p e d  t h e  c a p a c i t y  t o  p r o d u c e  
s u b j e c t i v e  e x p e r i e n c e  o v e r  a n d  a b o v e  n o n - c o n s c i o u s  
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information processing and behavior control, but in the 
light of the analogical argument for animal mental 
states, this is an arbitrary assumption. That only the 
human brain, and no brain of any other species, has 
precisely the level of development at which conscious­
ness becomes possible seems like an anthropocentric 
assumption.37 It is far more plausible to believe that 
consciousness in all its manifestations forms a 
continuum across species lines. 
There is, however, one crucial consideration which 
puts the arbitrariness of an anthropocentric assumption 
beyond question. If we locate the common-sense 
understanding ofanimal consciousness, scientific fact, 
and the argument from analogy within the context of a 
background theory, namely, the theory ofevolution, we 
have overwhelming reason to reject a mechanistic 
model of animal bebavior.38 The theory of evolution is 
a well-confirmed, respectable scientifiC theory ofgreat 
simplicity and wide explanatory power. It postulates 
evolutionary continuity or kinship between humans and 
animals and shatters the traditional divide between the 
two. Humans are part of the animal kingdom, and 
precisely the same forces which shape animal nature 
are at work in the shaping ofhuman nature, even though 
humans have attained a kind ofmental capacity which 
is a considerable advance upon thatofanimals. Humans 
and animals alike are genetically shaped in a complex 
and slow process ofinteraction with theirever-changing 
external environment in such a way that they can best 
be adapted to survive. The theory ofevolution explains 
biological phenomena, and it tells us why consciousness 
has survival valne. And if having a mind bas survival 
value for humans, then, given the physiological 
preconditions for mind as well as evolutionary 
continuity, having a mind would likewise have survival 
value for animals. 
So, common sense, scientific fact, the logic of 
argument by analogy, and the theory of evolution 
combine to make the ascription of conscious mental 
states to animals far more plausible than Carruthers's 
machine hypothesis. Of course, what I have said is still 
very general. One would have to look at particular case 
studies to make specific inferences about particular 
animal mental states in particular circumstances. But 
this can be done, and is being done, with varying degrees 
ofsuccess.39 Some animals behave in ways that are quite 
different from the ways in which humans behave in 
similar circumstances, and there are behavior variations 
among different kinds of species and among individual 
members of the same species. Which pet owner cannot 
tell some tale or another, such as the difference in the 
ability ofindividual cats to learn how to use a trap door? 
Apart from addressing the last premise in Carruthers's 
arguments, in the next paragraph I shall move beyond a 
general assertion of evolutionary continuity of 
consciousness by looking at the behavior of animals in 
situations that humans would fmd painful or stressful 
and asking whether we have reason to believe that 
animals actually feel pain or experience distress. 
7. Animal pain, distress, and suffering 
Carruthers's P5 says that having the capacity for 
conscious mental states, such as the capacity for 
conscious experience of pain, is a necessary condition 
for being an object ofmoral concern that makes claims 
upon our sympathy. (A sufficient condition of moral 
standing for him bas to be understood in the context of 
a Rawlsian agreement or contract among rational agents 
and encompassing only human beings.) The capacity 
to experience pain could quite rightly be said to be a 
kind of bottom-line mental capacity for grounding moral 
standing. But consistently with his denial that animals 
can have conscious mental states, Carruthers denies that 
animals can feel pain. 
Carruthers claims that pain, like any other mental 
state, admits of conscious and non-conscious varieties.40 
He concedes that there are no uncontroversial examples 
of non-conscious pain in humans which are parallel to 
our everyday examples of non-conscious visual 
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experience. Carruthers then asks whether there are cases 
of pain parallel to those of blindsight. that is. cases 
where the full, or nearly full, range of pain-behavior, is 
displayed without the subject being conscious of or 
feeling any pain. He concludes that he has no knowledge 
that such cases have actually occurred, but that the 
neurophysiology of pain perception suggests that they 
are in principle possible but then only as a result of 
surgical intervention. He then considers an imaginary 
example of someone who is never conscious of any 
pain in ber legs, but who displays much of the normal 
pain-behavior wben she suffers injury in that region. 
Carruthers concludes that this imaginary case of non­
conscious pain, or "ofevents that otherwise occupy the 
normal causal role of pain, but which are not available 
to be thought about consciously and spontaneously by 
tbe subject," is Oogically and physically) possible.41 
Pain, like other mental states, admits of conscious and 
non-conscious varieties, but since animals are incapable 
of thinking about their own mental states, their pains 
must all be non-conscious ones. 
There are three ways in which to resist this wildly 
counter-intuitive conclusion. We have already looked 
at two of these, namely, a critical analysis of 
Carruthers's distinction between conscious and non­
conscious mental states (paragraph 3), and an 
empirical explomtion of the possibility that animals 
have conscious mental states even on his flawed 
analysis of this distinction (paragmph 4). Here I wish 
to explore a third way, that is, the neurophysiology 
and neurochemistry of pain (and related notions) in 
humans and animals. This is an area of investigation 
which Carruthers simply disregards---as, unfortunately, 
do too many philosophers-in his attempt to make a 
case for tbe non-existence ofanimal pain and suffering. 
He prefers to use an imaginary example of non­
conscious pain (which, as he himself admits, is not a 
reality like blindsight) and to rely on an apriori analysis 
in which he intellectualizes suffering. Against 
Carruthers one could insist that the elements for a strong 
analogical argument for animal pain and suffering are 
provided by scientific knowledge about the bodily 
prerequisites for pain in humans and animals, coupled 
with evidence from observation of pain-like behavior 
in humans and animals in the appropriate circumstances. 
To deny that animals can feel pain, in spite of all the 
similarities between human and animal bodies and 
behavior, is extremely odd, if not bizarre, as the quota­
tion from Voltaire under the title of this paper suggests. 
What do we understand by tbe concept of pain? A 
common-sense understanding of pain necessarily 
includes a sensation or. feeling that is intrinsically 
unpleasant Pain, say David DeGrazia and Andrew N. 
Rowan, is either a particular kind of unpleasant 
sensation-identified by a particular phenomenological 
quality-or is a particular qualitative range ofunpleasant 
sensations.42 Pain is by defmition experienced so that 
expressions such as 'unexperienced pain' or 'unfelt pain' 
are self-contradictory. Similarly, according to common 
sense and ordinary language, Carruthers's notion ofnon­
conscious pain is self-contmdictory. 
Pain is, however, more than a sensation or feeling. 
Scientific work suggests that the human model of pain 
has three components, each of which provides an area 
of evidence for animal pain.43 The first component of 
pain is nociception or the detection of noxious stimuli 
which does not involve any conscious awareness.44 
Nociception is the detection of (potentially) tissue­
damaging stimuli by specialized neural end-organs 
with accompanying behavioral events, such as the 
reflexive withdmwal of the affected part of the body 
from the source of injury. Nociceptors exist in all 
mammals and birds, and evidence suggests the 
existence ofnociception in all vertebrates and possibly 
in some invertebrates such as cephalopods, for 
example, octopi and squids. 
The second component of pain is the perception of 
noxious stimuli.45 This is pain as feeling or sensation. 
One perceives noxious stimuli, but one does not 
perceive pain because pain is by defmition perceived. 
One bas, feels, or experiences pain. Several neuro­
anatomical aspects of the sensation component ofpain 
are relevant to the question whether animals can feel 
pain. First, all vertebrates possess the requisite spinal 
aspects ofpain perception, namely, neural connections 
between peripheral nociceptors and central nervous 
structures. It is doubtful that insects feel pain because 
they lack the extensive nervous system processing 
mechanisms that appear to be necessary' for pain, and 
tbeir behavior, wben faced with noxious stimuli, can 
be explained by tbe nociceptive reflex.46 Second, the 
thalamus and primary sensory cortex are the supm­
spinal structures implicated in pain perception, but there 
is uncertainty about the activity of the cerebral cortex 
in pain sensation. There are anatomical differences 
between species in the cerebral cortex, and these may 
have important implications for pain sensation and 
emotional response to pain (the third component of 
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pain). Similarity of these neural prerequisites for pain 
permits the possibility of pain sensation in all 
vertebrates, but there are qualitative and quantitative 
differences in pain sensation grounded in rapid sensory­
discriminatory ability and in the greater influence of 
cognition (made possible by the third component of 
pain). Third, endogenous pain-control or pain­
modulating mechanisms are constituted by both 
complex descending pain-control circuits and the 
opiate system (endogenous opioid peptides, such as 
endorphins). These mechanisms probably exist in all 
mammals, and there is even evidence for them in 
invertebrates such as earthworms. Fourth, there is stress­
induced analgesia consisting ofan opioid-dependent and 
a non-opioid system, both ofwhich can be activated by 
nociceptive stimulation and by various psychological 
stresses, such as exposure to a novel environment It 
involves supra-spinal mechanisms, but available data 
is limited. In sheep, for example, the non-opioid system 
predominates. 
The third component of pain is motivational­
affective, involving cognitive and emotional 
capacities.47 Noxious stimuli or sensory inputs are not 
only felt or sensed, but are cognitively evaluated or 
interpreted and result in emotional behaviororaffective 
response. Hence pain is defined not merely as sensation, 
but as unpleasant sensation. Both evaluation and 
behavioral response require a certain level ofcognitive 
ability which in tum is grounded in, or made possible 
by, the cerebral cortex. The motivational-affective 
component may assume greater complexity and 
importance in the pain perception of animals with a 
developed cerebral cortex. The minimal level of 
cognitive development for pain perception remains 
speculative. It is suggested that only the most 
rudimentary level is required, and on this basis pain is 
recognized in all vertebrate species. 
Given these three components of pain, as well as 
pain-associated behavior, we have solid grounds for 
believing that all vertebrate species are capable ofpain. 
This is not the case with imputing the capacity for pain 
to invertebrates, but evidence of pain-associated 
behavior in some invertebrates should give one reason 
to pause. It is not known what the capacity for 
motivational-affective modulation of pain is in less 
complex vertebrates such as fish, amphibians and 
reptiles. In mammals, pain sensation is modulated by 
emotional and cognitive modalities. Great apes have a 
level of cognitive development which indicates that 
cognitive processes are likely to have a greater 
influence on their experience of pain. Human beings 
differ from animals in the cognitive modalities ofpain 
perception, cognition being a major determinant of 
their pain perception. In short, the neurophysiology, 
neurochemistry, and behavioral repertoire of pain 
support the thesis that many if not all vertebrates 
experience pain.48 
Pain and suffering are related but not identical 
concepts. I may be in pain (that is, have a nociceptive 
response to a knife thrust into my arm, have a hurtful 
sensation, and have a cognitive and emotional response 
to both this action and hurtful sensation) without 
suffering. Suffering, unlike pain, is not a sensation and 
is not locatable in particular body parts.49 When does 
the experience of pain involve suffering? Suffering 
could be defined as the unpleasant emotional response 
to more than minimal pain or distress.5° Emotions are 
thus implicated in pain as well as suffering, but the 
emotion induced by suffering is the result of pain with 
a raised level of intensity or duration. 
Suffering is, however, not only caused by pain but 
also by distress. Distress is a state in which a human or 
animal is unable to adapt to an altered environment or 
to altered internal stimuli.51 Distress can take different 
forms, such as anxiety, fear, or boredom. Anxiety, for 
example, can be defmed as "an emotional response­
typically unpleasant, typically involving heightened 
arousal and attentiveness to the environment, and 
typically inhibiting action-to the perception ofa threat 
to one's well-being or to one's ego (sense ofself)."52 It 
is not clear whether anxiety is, like pain, always felt, 
but in the context of animal welfare felt anxiety is of 
most interest. In this definition 'perception' of threat 
allows for cases where no real threat exists, and threat 
to 'ego' accommodates typically human cases. Anxiety 
causes people to feel more pain given a particular 
stimulus;53 the experience of pain can be attenuated or 
accentuated by emotion.54 Clearly, then, the concepts 
of pain, distress (anxiety and the like), and suffering 
are located in the same conceptual field. 
Are animals capable of experiencing anxiety? 
There are good reasons, based on analogical inference 
from observable facts, for believing that they do. 
Anxiety in humans as well as inferred 'anxious' states 
in animals are accompanied by typical anxious 
behavior, are modulated in the same way by drugs, 
and produce neurophysiological and neurochemical 
changes. Symptoms characteristic of states of anxiety, 
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which are observed in both humans and animals in 
circumstances that cause human anxiety, are motor 
tension (shakiness, etc.), autonomic hyperactivity 
(sweating, pounding heart, etc.), apprehensive 
expectation (inhibition ofbehavioral repertoire in novel 
situations), and hyperattentiveness (vigilance and 
scanning).55 Animals have been used in experiments to 
develop anxiety-relieving drugs for humans. The 
neurochemical basis of anxiety is the benzodiazepine 
receptors in the central nervous system in human 
beings and animals. 56 Benzodiazepine receptors are 
present in vertebrate species, including fish, but no 
significant levels have been detected in invertebrates.57 
In other words, the physiological basis of anxiety, 
namely receptor sites for benzodiazepine, exists in all 
vertebrates.58 Studies in monkeys and rats, for 
example, demonstrate that benzodiazepine receptors 
are involved in both the affective and physiological 
manifestations of anxiety in these species, although 
there are species variations.59 
Thus, the analogical argument for animal anxiety 
moves from anxiety in humans, evidenced by human 
anxious behavior and benzodiazepine receptors, to 
inferred animal anxiety, evidenced by animal anxious 
behavior and benzodiazepine receptors. It is an 
empirical argument from behavioral and neural 
similarities to conscious mental states. This analogy 
gives us excellent reason for believing that mental states 
mediate between the physical or psychological anxiety­
inducing stimulus and the physiological anxious 
response, thus rejecting the claim that anxiety (and other 
forms of distress) in animals is simply a mechanical­
physical matter.60 
Finally, are animals capable of suffering 
induced by pain or distress (such as anxiety)? Given 
that suffering is defined as the unpleasant emotional 
response to pain or distress, the question of animal 
suffering raises the question of animal emotion. In the 
discussion of the three components of pain, I have 
already suggested that there are behavioral and neural 
analogies between humans and animals which give us 
inductive reason to infer animal emotions. Emotions 
modulate pain and anxious experiences. Since emotion 
is the affective response to an evaluation and 
interpretation of sensory inputs from the internal and 
external environment, evidence of the existence of 
emotion supports the possibility of pain and anxious 
experiences. Animals, then, can suffer in the form of 
having an unpleasant emotional response, and their 
suffering is caused by pain or distress (such as anxiety) 
that is more than minimal. 
I have merely given a crude outline of conceptual 
and empirical considerations-both behavioral and 
anatomical similarity, set in the contextofevolutionary 
kinship-relevant to the possibility of animal pain, 
distress, and suffering. But it is sufficient to provide 
adequateprimafacie reason to distrust Carruthers's case 
against (conscious) animal pain, pain for him being an 
avoidance mechanism without feeling, a case grounded 
in imaginary examples and apriori argument. Although 
animals do not have the most sophisticated intellectual 
abilities, associated with human language, to evaluate 
and interpret pain, distress or suffering, we have 
overwhelming scientific evidence to support the 
widespread commonsensical belief, grounded in the 
human analogy, that animals do feel pain, are anxious, 
and do suffer. 
8. Ethics and non-conscious animals 
Carruthers's moral conclusion, C2, is that animals 
are not objects of moral concern that make claims on 
our sympathy. He believes that if he is right about the 
non-consciousness of animal mental states, "then it 
ought to be strictly impossible to feel sympathy for 
animals, once the true nature of their mental contents 
is properly understood... The truth may be that it is 
only our imperfect rationality that enables us to feel 
sympathy for animals at all."61 This is a far-reaching 
conclusion, and Carruthers does not shy away from 
spelling out its consequences: "The most important 
practical conclusion of this book is that there is no basis 
for extending moral protection to animals beyond that 
which is already provided."62 In particular, there are no 
good moral grounds for forbidding hunting, factory 
farming, or laboratory testing on animals. Feelings of 
sympathy for animals "serve only to divert attention 
from the claims of those who do have moral standing, 
namely human beings."63 
Just as key premises in Carruthers's argument are 
false, C2 is also false. His moral conclusion is a species 
of educated folly which deserves to be buried along 
with its seventeenth-century Cartesian ancestors. From 
a dubious philosophy of mind he draws a moral 
conclusion which, if acted upon, would serve to 
stabilize the status quo. An alternative conclusion­
supported by common sense, the logic of analogical 
reasoning and the theory ofevolution-is that sentient 
Summer 1993 153 Between the Species 
Educated About Animal Minds and Animal Suffering 
animals, that is, animals that are capable of pain and 
suffering, have moral standing and, as such, set limits 
to our actions in virtue ofwhat they are in themselves. 
On this alternative conclusion practices like factory 
farming cause unspeakable suffering. To claim that 
expending time and energy on this moral issue diverts 
attention from the needs ofhuman beings is to suggest 
that one can only properly pay attention to one thing 
in one's life-plan, or that animal welfare and human 
welfare are mutually exclusive. These are not the case. 
Life is indeed too short to pursue all worthwhile causes 
at once. But one could argue persuasively that 
domesticated animals are part of human communities 
and are owed duties of care and gratitude. Regard for 
animals is not an invention of a decadent moral 
society,64 but is a human moral sense which has deep 
historical and social roots. 65 Moreover, vested 
economic interests, structural political power, and 
human wickedness are far more fundamental and 
pervasive causes of a failure to address human 
suffering than the animal rights (animal welfare; 
animal protection) movement. But this is another issue. 
In conclusion, Carruthers, having argued that 
animals have only non-conscious mental states, 
cautions that his argument is controversial and 
speculative, and that it may well turn out to be 
unsound.66 Consequently, it may be wiser, he says, to 
continue to respond to animals as if their mental states 
were conscious ones until a consensus emerges 
amongst philosophers and psychologists concerning 
the nature of consciousness, and among ethologists 
over the cognitive powers of animals. The good news 
is, however, that consciousness is being regained in 
both psychology and ethology and that philosophy has 
long ago dumped logical positivism, the bedfellow of 
behaviorism, which denies consciousness. A lack of 
consensus on animal consciousness may very well be 
explained, in part at least. by the vested interests of 
researchers who do routine science within a scientific 
paradigm which denies animals consciousness.67 
Biology has unfortunately been slow to follow physics 
in accepting inferred unobservables as respectable 
explanatory concepts. 
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